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Particular ethical and political dilemmas arise in representing the lives of people 
who are marginalised within, and by, the domain of public knowledge. In order to 
remain critically self-aware about the decisions we take as researchers we need 
to be able to make explicit both the nature of the dilemmas we face, and the 
losses, as well as gains, that result from our decisions. This chapter discusses 
some of the representational dilemmas of research work with children, that is, 
issues arising in our production of research accounts for dissemination in the 
public sphere. What claims to represent children’s voices can adult researchers 
legitimately make? And what meanings may we unwittingly reinforce as we make 
such public re/presentations? 
 
Different research methodologies provide different claims for the status of the 
knowledge produced. Whilst both ethnographic and discourse analytic 
approaches can enable a response to the political call to ‘hear the voices of 
children’, and provide a means of re/presenting their opinions in ‘the public 
sphere’, they often entail radically different ideas about language. As a 
consequence they make different kinds of representational claims about the 
status of their accounts. What are the implications of these different claims and 
warrants for knowledge in terms of the strategies they provide for feminist or 
critical researchers? 
 
In order to make a particular intervention in public debate, I want to be able to 
claim that the research account I produce represents participants, yet I have 
political and theoretical doubts about the representational claims that have 
conventionally warranted research, and about the particular notion of ‘the subject’ 
which metaphors of voice serve. The dilemmas arise from my recognition, or 
suspicion, that despite these doubts, the discourse of voice and the claims of 
objectivism and realism to guarantee my ‘findings’, do still provide the most 
powerful warrant for my research account. What are the pitfalls or limitations of 
responding to the ‘voices of children’ discourse within the terms of existing 
debates? Might a ‘hybrid’ approach of discourse-ethnography offer a way 
forward? 
 
To what extent are these representational issues common to research with any 
marginalised group, or specific to research work with children? I believe that the 
issues themselves apply to research with any less powerful social group who 
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have little access to the practices of public knowledge production. However, the 
dilemmas we face must involve the consideration of the specific meanings 
attributed particular social groups since, for instance, in the case of children, 
certain ideas about their psychological development can allow them to be more 
easily disqualified as participants of research. Exploring the dilemmas in relation 
to children therefore engages both specific discussion within contemporary 
childhood research (Alanen, 1990; James and Prout, 1990; Kitzinger, 1990; 
Mayall, 1994; Waksler, 1991), and more general debates in feminist theory about 
the status of knowledge after the ‘crisis of representation’.  
 
For three years I was the researcher on the Children’s Representations of Family 
Life project with Dr Margaret O’Brien in the Department of Sociology at the 
University of East London. I conducted individual interviews and group 
discussions with children at a primary school and also piloted some graphic 
approaches. Whilst this chapter doesn’t draw specifically from material gathered 
for this study, (but see O’Brien, Alldred and Jones, 1996), my consideration of 
the issues raised was stimulated by this fieldwork and came to be articulated 
more theoretically during my subsequent PhD research. 
 
Hearing children’s voices: the political discourse of voice  
In the West, there are now established popular discourses of the moral 
imperative to ‘hear the voices’ of women, of Black and Asian peoples, of lesbians 
and gay men, of postcolonial subjects, of people with disabilities, and now, 
tentatively, of people with learning difficulties, PWAs (people living with AIDS) 
and ‘mental health’/system and abuse survivors. The struggles that these reflect 
have been about striving to be recognized fully as ‘subjects’. These, along with 
inter-ethnic conflicts, are struggles over identities and the status granted them, 
rather than over material resources and economics. Political philosophers such 
as Nancy Fraser identify these as forms of the ‘recognition’ rather than 
‘redistribution’ struggles which have come to characterize contemporary politics 
(Fraser, 1995). The ‘recognition’ granted these hitherto marginal subjects has 
begun a process of decentring ‘the (Western) subject’, and has shaken the 
unthinking confidence with which the dominant masculinist, Eurocentric 
perspective has been assumed to be the perspective. 
 
Children are another socially silenced group: their opinions are not heard in the 
public sphere and they wield little power as a social group. Adults are generally 
more powerful relative to, and specifically over, children. As Brannen and O’Brien 
note there is increasing consciousness of the fact that ‘...children’s worlds have 
typically become known through adult accounts’ (1996: 1). The demand to ‘hear 
the voices of children’ relies upon these earlier struggles as ‘conditions of 
possibility’ and employs the same discourses of empowerment and metaphors of 
voice and perspective. The cultural spaces for children’s voices which have 
opened up over the past decade in the UK are illustrated by the increasing 
concern in the legal sphere to take children’s ‘wishes and feelings and self-
 3
defined preferences into account whenever possible’ (Roche, 1996: 27) 
(expressed, for instance, in the Children Act 1989, the Scottish Law Commission, 
1992 and supported, at least in principle, by the UK government’s ratification of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1991), as well as by the 
emergence of organisations and advice centres which are predicated on 
children’s participation and articulation (children’s magazines such as Children 
Express, and organisations such as Who Cares? which aims to give children in 
residential care more of a public voice). The process of recognizing children as 
subjects is similar in rhetorical character to these earlier struggles, but has 
lagged somewhat behind.  
 
Children’s voices (or my re-presentation of their voices) are notably absent from 
this chapter. Instead, I focus on the claims of adult researchers, and how we may 
warrant our accounts of what children say. Of course, some of the arguments I 
make about the difficulties surrounding researchers’ claims to represent children, 
apply to my representation of the work of other researchers. However, there are 
also significant differences: firstly, I am representing adult researchers, not child 
participants (although I will consider whether this alters or simply intensifies the 
issues); and secondly, material I re-present is from published research that 
researchers have already placed in the public sphere (so I am not serving up 
privately elicited accounts for public consumption, as is the case for much 
research). Following Spivak’s (1988) distinction between representation meaning 
proxy, or meaning portrayal, I am representing other researchers in the sense of 
portrayal (the ‘photographic’ meaning of representation), but not in the sense of 
advocacy. However, in our research roles, these two may not be clearly 
distinguished, or indeed, we may wish to ‘represent children’ in both senses. 
Interrogating the doctrine of empiricism raises problems with both these 
meanings of ‘representing children’.  
 
James and Prout (1990) note the elision of a temporal (re-presenting) and a 
significatory meaning of ‘representation’. Whilst the temporal meaning of 
repeating raises the possibility of seeing representation as an active process, 
and therefore one which is conducted from a particular perspective, the word re-
presentation does not insist on this. Indeed, both of these meanings may assume 
that an object exists and is then truthfully reflected in (portrayed by) its 
representation. I think this ambiguity about what the word means 
epistemologically is what Hall (1992) identifies when he notes that the term is 
used currently not only as an unproblematic notion of ‘image of’ (portrayal or 
signification), but also to indicate a radical displacement of that notion. I prefer to 
use the terms ‘re-presentation’ and re/presentation to indicate that my research 
account is actively produced by me and embodies my perspective, using the 
former when emphasizing process and the latter when emphasizing its 
significance for cultural politics. However, neither seems to allow me to 
distinguish the epistemological positions which this chapter discusses. By making 
reference to the word ‘representational’ (even with a critical note) they each 
suggest to me both an empirical meaning of portrayal, and the significance for 
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cultural politics of either images of a social group or their advocacy. I like the way 
in which ‘re/presentation’ admits this ambivalence. 
 
My use in this chapter of the ‘discourse of voice’ must be distinguished from the 
specific approach of Carol Gilligan and co-workers (however, see Andrea Doucet 
and Natasha Mauthner, in this volume). I am referring to the particular, but loose, 
set of metaphors of voice which circulate in popular political discourse and link 
(political) perspective closely with ‘who the speaker is’. 
 
Childhood research: giving voice to children? 
The empirical study of children in the West has, for the last 150 years, been 
regarded as the domain of psychology. Within this discipline children have been 
treated as the (passive) objects of study; scrutinized, tested and measured 
(Burman, 1994; Rose, 1985). The focus has been on what happens to them (and 
processes they undergo), rather than what they do or say. The psychological 
construction of the individual which underpins this is hegemonic and has 
provided the foundation for sociological thinking too. However, for children, it is 
confounded with developmentalism: the construction of a linear, sequential and 
normalized process by which children become adults. As Qvortrup (1987) notes, 
this constructs children as more like ‘human becomings’, than human beings. 
Developmental discourses, therefore, exacerbate children’s objectification within 
research. It is not unless children are seen as people in their own right that they 
can be thought of as participants of research (Speier, 1973, cf Corsaro, 1981). 
 
As the children’s rights movement has been developing in the UK, ethnographic 
research has ‘given voice’ to children, enabling them to begin to play a more 
direct part in the production of sociological knowledge than the adult/researcher 
determined categories of survey or experimental methods (James and Prout, 
1990). Hence discourses of ‘giving voice’ offer a way of constructing children as 
active subjects, not objects, and of recognizing that they may have distinct 
perspectives on the world. The recognition that meaning embodies perspective is 
at least an implicit challenge to objectivism and the arrogant assumption that a 
perspective is universal, an account definitive. Ethnography has the most 
established place in the social sciences and humanities as an approach which 
attempts to place subjects’ own perspectives centrally. Its ethical promise rests 
on its (compatability with) voice metaphors; its political force, on the salience 
attributed identity in contemporary political discourses; and its immense appeal, 
on its ‘promise to delve into the “concrete” (in the hope of finding “real” people 
living “real” lives)’ (Probyn, 1993: 72). Because it matters ‘that some speak and 
that others are merely spoken’ (Probyn, ibid), it offers to meet feminist concerns 
to ‘give voice’ to those whose opinions are rarely heard. 
 
Research is, therefore, seen as one of the ways of providing spaces in which 
hitherto silenced people can ‘be heard’ and be recognized as subjects. It is 
hoped that interview-based research and the dissemination of ‘findings’ in the 
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public sphere can provide a platform for, or can amplify, these voices. Like most 
researchers, I imagine, my personal investment in the hope that research has a 
progressive impact, means that there are personal, as well as institutional risks 
involved in explicating the politics of research relations and the effectivity of 
research as an intervention in particular public debates or broader cultural 
politics. 
 
Ethnographers often use the discourse of voice empirically to mean something 
akin to perspective, and perhaps some use it in a less literal, illustrative way. 
Whilst discourse analysis is an approach which can be employed to analyze the 
things children say, it rejects some of the theoretical underpinnings of the voice-
as-perspective discourse. However, both approaches can recognize that 
interviews are a particular form of social interaction in which the discursive 
exchange is constructed jointly by researcher and participant; see meanings as 
grounded in their contexts; and base analysis and interpretation on a theory of 
discourse and meaning (Mishler, 1986). 
 
What Oakley (1981) called the ‘hygienic’, traditional approach to interviewing 
obscures the relations of power that characterize the research relationship. 
However, a discursive approach requires us to consider reflexively the 
institutional power carried by researchers, and to avoid creating the illusion of 
‘democratized’ research through the fantasy of empowerment (Marks, 1993). 
Whilst ethnography can lodge a powerful critique of the conventional research 
practices Oakley described, it can also be employed within an otherwise 
conventional approach. The following three sections describe key tensions that 
can arise within the ethnographic study of children, which are, I believe, general 
representational dilemmas for researchers. They challenge the assumption that 
adults’ benevolent attempts to represent children (as proxy or advocate) are 
necessarily always in their interests, and the simplicity with which it is assumed 
that what children say can be represented (portrayed) through research. 
 
Ethnography of ‘children’s culture’ 
In order to gain access to children’s perspectives, William Corsaro employed the 
ethnographic technique of participant observation through which he became ‘...a 
participant in children’s culture’ (Corsaro, 1981: 118) , ‘...joining in the children’s 
activities whilst not affecting the nature or flow of peer episodes’ (ibid: 133). 
Notions such as ‘...entering the child’s world’ (Mandell, 1986; 1991) and 
interacting ‘with children in their perspective’ (Mandell, 1991: 59) (emphasis 
added) imply that adults and children occupy separate social spheres. It 
constructs children as little aliens to the dominant culture, the exotic objects of 
some other culture. ‘Other’, that is, to the presumed norm or centrality of adult 
culture (which is itself thus imputed with homogeneity and consensuality). The 
centrality of the researcher and the pseudo-colonialist relation of rendering the 
strange in terms familiar to the observer culture - which is sometimes reinforced 
by metaphors of travel (Pratt, 1986a, cf Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) - is, of 
course, not particular to work with children. For contemporary childhood research 
there is surely a tension between studying children simply as people, and giving 
them research (or political) attention because they are currently marginalised, 
which then risks reinforcing the idea of them as a ‘special case’. So fundamental 
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is our ‘knowledge’ of adult-child difference that it’s difficult to imagine research in 
which participants happen to include adults and children, yet no between-groups 
comparison is made. Although, for the present, a strong case can be made for 
the benefits of ‘special case’ attention.  
 
When considering his power as researcher, Corsaro notes that ‘...adults are 
much bigger than children and are perceived as being socially more powerful’ 
(Corsaro, 1981: 118). Physical size may well have been significant (although he 
did not attempt the ‘least-adult’ role that Mandell, 1986; 1991 developed), but it is 
only one of the features that may have affected the interaction between the 
children and himself. He might also have considered the ways in which the 
interaction was informed by dominant cultural meanings assigned to his age and 
gender, and ideas about paternal playfulness and pedagogic authority. However, 
in later debates amongst researchers about the extent to which adults can enter 
children’s worlds, Corsaro (1985, cf Mandell, 1991) insists that age and authority 
continue to separate adults and children and so qualifies his participation as 
partial, whereas others argue that all aspects of adult superiority except physical 
differences can be cast aside and that adults can participate fully in children’s 
culture (Goode, 1986; Waksler, 1986, both cited from Mandell, 1991). 
Beyond the interaction, in later stages of the research process, there is also an 
unequal power relationship. Not only are adult researchers ‘...perceived as being 
socially more powerful’, they are more powerful by virtue of their role as 
researchers, through which they are in a position to interpret, as well as to 
represent (Burman, 1992). The reflexive consideration of researchers’ power and 
status is limited by a focus on the dynamics of the interaction ‘in the field’, with 
little consideration of the broader power relations within which this is constituted. 
This is a criticism that Probyn (1993) makes of even some recent ethnography: 
that reflexivity extends only to the immediate context of meaning production 
(here, the classroom), and not adequately to the production of meaning in the 
account (processes occurring back in the academy).  
Corsaro does identify the problem of adult assumptions and interpretations of 
children’s behaviour and abilities, so recognizes that how children are heard is an 
issue. He believes that an adult perspective is the result of removing the 
interaction from its full social context. However, although ‘adult interpretations 
and assumptions about children’s behavior are themselves topics for inquiry 
(Schwartzman, 1978)’ (Corsaro, 1981: 118), such a study is viewed as separate: 
 One of the central aims of ethnographies of childhood culture is the 
suspension of such  interpretations. The researcher must attempt to free himself 
[sic] from adult conceptions of  children’s activities and enter the child’s world 
as both observer and participant. (ibid: 119,  emphasis in the original) 
The idea that it is possible to suspend, or step outside of, the cultural meanings 
assigned to childhood must be viewed with scepticism. From where might the 
researcher’s conceptual framework - indeed, the words to speak - then come 
from? A more realistic aim might be to attempt to examine the ‘adult conceptions’ 
closely alongside, and in relation to, the observations that one makes. In this way 
one could begin to reflect upon the concepts and processes of the analysis as an 
 7
‘...interrogation of the methods ...simultaneously with, and as an integral part of, 
the investigation of the object (Woolgar, 1982)’ (Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988: 8). 
The approach adopted by both Corsaro and Mandell is realist and implicitly 
objectivist: children’s culture is seen as existing prior to, and independently of, 
the researcher’s gaze, so that they may enter that culture, observe it without 
altering it, then objectively report without distortion what they have ‘merely 
observed’. Therefore, the ethnographer’s perception is the key warrant for the 
knowledge produced. Corsaro’s ‘escape from’ an adult perspective into the ‘real’ 
children’s culture demonstrates his reliance on conventional notions of language 
as reflective or representational (rather than constitutive) and consequently he 
presents his work as a straight-forward representation or portrayal of children’s 
culture. Claiming this representational status is so conventionalized in Western 
scientific discourse that the warrant need not be made explicit. Ethnographic 
techniques can embody a realist epistemology even where they have rejected 
(unitary) objectivism. So that whilst a researcher explicitly recognizes the 
existence of different perspectives (hence studying the participants’), it is simply 
assumed that readers of the research will rest their faith in the researcher’s own 
perspective.  
Otherness and the centre 
Ethnography is ‘...a writing practice in which the other is inscribed within, and 
explained by, the power of the ethnographer’s language’ (Grossberg, 1989: 23) 
with ‘...the onus on the other to fit her experiences into an understandable order’ 
(Probyn, 1993: 63). As in the classical anthropological monographs documenting 
the West’s cultural Others, the crucial relation is of the observed culture to the 
researcher’s culture. Can a description by an outsider remain faithful to the 
framework of the subjects, as it is inevitably rendered in the observer’s terms? Is 
the representation to a dominant group or culture of ‘other’ perspectives 
necessarily imperialist, serving to bolster their own sense of centrality and extend 
cultural power through ‘knowledge of’? But how else can that centrality be 
challenged? 
 
Adult-(ethno)centrism can be seen to operate at both an individual level, whereby 
adults tend to interpret the actions and utterances of children as immature 
versions of their own speech and behaviour (Bruner, Jolly and Sylva, 1976), and 
also at a cultural level. A researcher employing a discourse analytic approach 
might share the concern with adult-centrism without expecting to be able to avoid 
it. Since representation is through language, and the language and hegemonic 
concepts are those of the dominant culture, marginalized groups have described 
how the dominant conceptual framework which is not ‘their own’ may be imbued 
with negativities for them (for instance, Spender, 1985, on the androcentricism of 
the English language). For adult-dominated culture, language is, ‘by definition’, 
reflective and productive of adult power, status and authority. Since the whole 
frame of reference is adult-centred, it is difficult to see to what extent children 
could, as ethnographic subjects, present ‘their own’ account of their worlds. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that children are having to render themselves 
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meaningful in adult-centred terms, and explain themselves convincingly to those 
in power over them (this parallels the discussion by Ros Edwards and Jane 
Ribbens, this volume). Seen in this light, children’s interviews, because they 
entail the requirement to make sense for adults, might not necessarily be 
empowering occasions for children. The idea that any ethnographic subjects are 
free to present their own meanings in any radical sense neglects the ways in 
which the dominant culture provides hegemonic meanings. 
 
Post-structuralist approaches to language disallow the fantasy of speaking from 
outside of the language system, which is why feminist writers influenced by post-
structuralism (Butler, 1990; Diamond and Quinby, 1988; Weedon, 1987) 
emphasize the recognition of resistance to powerful discourses. Recognizing the 
fact that in providing a research voice for a particular group we may 
simultaneously reinforce their construction as Other, and concurrently our own 
perspective or the dominant cultural perspective as central, prevents us from 
naively assuming that our work is bound to be liberatory. Patai (1991) believes 
that ethical research is simply not possible in an unjust world, since researchers 
replicate structures of privilege through the institution of knowledge. Taking up a 
position as one who knows, in relation to those who are oppressed, is fraught 
with ethical problems which are not asuaged by good intentions. At the very 
least, this requires that we focus on the potential losses as well as gains of 
particular approaches to research. In relation to placing children’s voices in the 
public sphere, we need to examine the broader context of meanings that will be 
brought into play. Through what cultural understandings of children are the words 
of any child heard?  
How we hear what children say 
Corsaro (1981) notes that adults often describe as ‘silly’ or unimportant what they 
do not understand in children’s speech or behaviour. Berry Mayall describes how 
discussions of ‘methodological issues’ in childhood research sometimes 
constructs children ‘...as cognitive incompetents, [..] routinely wrong and 
misunderstand[ing]; likely to confuse fact with fiction; and ...give the answers they 
think adults want rather than reply accurately’ (1996: 13). She reminds us that 
adults also vary in our knowledge and experience, and that ‘...we [all] interweave 
fact and fiction both consciously and unconsciously and tell interviewers what we 
think they want to know’ (ibid). This illustrates how the specific cultural positioning 
of children within developmental discourses of incompleteness, and as ‘not yet 
there’, can further extend the doubts that some have about the validity of 
‘subjective’ research in general. Where objectivism prevails, the subjectivity that 
is understood as a problem for research, is seen as exaggerated in the case of 
children. There also exist particular ideas about children’s communication skills, 
knowledge and self-reflection. Therefore, it is not just a case of hearing children’s 
voices, but of how we hear their voices. In terms of feminist intervention, it might 
be that providing a public platform for children’s perspectives is not enough. We 
need to attend to the meanings that will be made of the accounts. 
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Both possible meanings of the title of this section are in operation. By 
emphasizing the how of ‘How we hear what children say’, I am arguing that, as 
researchers, we face decisions about how to go about trying to hear what 
children say. Different methods are underpinned by alternative epistemological 
perspectives which provide different ways of thinking about the relation between 
participants’ voices and the knowledge that is produced about them. 
Alternatively, when hear is emphasized, attention is drawn to the way in which 
children’s voices are actually heard. This problematizes the passivity which ‘to 
hear’ usually conveys and highlights issues of interpretation. How do both 
specific context and broader cultural discourses affect the ways in which what 
children say is understood? Although not conceptually distinct, we can consider 
this at the level of how researchers hear children, and then how research reports 
are heard in the public sphere.  
Children’s voices are heard through cultural constructions of childhood. It is 
simultaneous attention to childhood, as opposed to a sole focus on (particular) 
children, that distinguishes writers influenced by social constructionism, such as 
Burman (1992), Marks (1996), Mayall (1996), and James and Prout (1990), from 
more conventional ethnographers such as Corsaro (1981; 1986) and Mandell 
(1986; 1991). Some discourse analytic approaches, such as Parker’s (1992), can 
take into account the social construction of childhood, by insisting that we bring in 
knowledge of discourses from ‘outside’of the research, including those that our 
politics identify as broader power relations, in order to analyze discourse. 
 
The status of ‘voice’ in discourse analytic research 
In post-structuralist informed discourse analytic research, representations of 
interviewees’ account are made without a realist, objectivist warrant. Research is 
recognized to be a practice of re-presentation, and ‘findings’ a re/presentation 
through a particular lens. This invites reflexivity about the production of the 
account. The participant’s ‘voice’ is seen as produced from what was culturally 
available to them, rather than from a private reserve of meaning. The fantasy of 
the authentic subject, one whose subjectivity is imagined to be independent of, or 
prior to, culture is rejected. Deborah Marks interviewed young people about 
exclusion from school. She writes:  
 researching into people’s experience is fraught with epistemological and 
ontological dilemmas. Social constructionist theory has warned that giving 
our ‘subject’ a ‘voice’ involves the fantasy that it is possible to have 
unmediated direct knowledge of experience (James and Prout, 1990). 
 Derrida has challenged the phonocentricism implicit in the notion of 
speech as a direct and immediate form of expression. Giving primacy to 
interviewees’ talk about their experience of exclusion suggests that their 
speech may refer to themselves as a unified authentic subject. This 
 Cartesian subject, whose self-consciousness acts as guarantor of 
meaning, is challenged both by  versions of psychoanalysis (Althusser, 
1971; Frosh, 1987) and discourse analysis (Parker, 1992),  which see 
the subject as being fragmented and constituted within language. (Marks, 
1996: 115) 
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Marks does not treat the accounts obtained as final and fixed, rather they are 
‘...often ambivalent, contradictory and changing’ (ibid: 115). She notes that ‘the 
relationship between an original exclusion and the way pupils talk about it in their 
interview or discussion group is highly complex’, and therefore she doesn’t ask 
about their experiences in order to try to establish ‘what really happened’. She 
does not position herself as able to ‘penetrate the manifest content in order to 
reveal its hidden kernel’ and so she is not central in her warrant for the research 
knowledge: ‘I cannot say how participants really experienced the exclusion. 
However, asking about the experience of exclusion brings forth a number of 
productive ways of seeing the event’ (ibid: 116). 
 
For some pupils, the tone of the interview was confessional as they took 
responsibility for bad behaviour. Other accounts took the form of factual reports 
and had a disengaged tone, and in a third type, pupils protested their innocence. 
The complexity of thoughts and feelings about their exclusions meant that they 
might be positioned in a variety of conflicted ways. Whilst identifying how these 
may have functioned psychologically and emotionally for the individuals, and 
indeed for herself - since she too experienced exclusion by the children during a 
group discussion - she deliberately avoids ‘...establishing an opposition between 
emotional, conflicted and hence “authentic” accounts and generalised, jargon-
laden “inauthentic” accounts’ (Marks, 1996: 129). The imperative that discourse 
analysts attend the broader social meanings within which research occurs leads 
Marks to consider these interviews in relation to powerful psychological 
discourses of self-regulating individuals who, on reflection, repent their 
misdemeanors. The possibility that the interviews functioned to further regulate 
some participants by providing a space in which they drew themselves under 
disciplinary gaze to produce themselves as good children and self-governing 
individuals, prevented Marks from assuming the interviews to be necessarily (or 
only) liberating.  
 
Warranting discourse analytic work  
Many feminist theorists use post-structuralist approaches to show how 
knowledge claims entail plays of power. Without an appeal to objectivity and 
without asserting the centrality of one’s own perspective, with what authority can 
one present discourse analytic research? Is there an alternative rhetoric of 
research? Most importantly, could an alternative support effective feminist or 
critical intervention? This issue is key in debates about feminism and 
postmodernism, as well as having exercised researchers who have taken the 
reflexive ‘turn to language’. Burman et al. (1996) argue that rejecting 
conventional ideas of authorship and of knowing through personal identities need 
not mean losing the relevance of individual experience, nor the possibility of 
political critique. Losing faith in objectivity need not mean completely undermining 
our own warrants for speaking critically (Burman, 1990). Fraser and Nicholson 
(1990) argue that feminists might present local empirical accounts, without the 
grandnarratives which universalize and ahistorisize. Empiricism without 
objectivist foundations they argue, requires us to extend self-reflexivity to 
recognize that our analyses, as well as their objects, are culturally specific.  
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Erica Burman (1992) interviewed primary-school aged children, but neither 
warrants her analyses by appeal to objectivism, nor grounds her interpretation 
solely in her ontology. Her own psychological processes form part of her 
reflections on her interpretation, but are not the warrant for it. She argues that 
reflexivity must include the broader context; relations not just within, but also 
beyond, the interview:  
One of the places where feminist and post-structuralist concerns meet is in 
affirming reflexivity, both as structured within research relationships (no 
longer colluding in the sanitization of  subjectivity, identification and emotion 
from research encounters) and within the theory-method relation (e.g. 
Hollway, 1989; Walkerdine, 1986). (ibid: 47) 
 
Through an analysis of interview exerpts, Burman demonstrates how the 
structural relations of power and discursive positioning (of interviewee and 
interviewer), as well as broader social relations of power and knowledge, can 
inform the micro-analysis of statements from an interview. She argues that 
drawing on the broader context in this way prevents her refusal to claim 
objectivity from collapsing into a complete relativization of her analysis. This 
theoretical position treads a careful path between naive realism and an idealism 
which could fall prey to relativism and immaterialism.  
 
In the research, Burman set up an agreed exchange of interviewer and 
interviewee roles with the children, which allowed moments in which the children 
occupied powerful positions in relation to her. The concept of researcher and 
researched occupying particular ‘subject positions’, (rather than being thought of 
as subjects whose position is unitary and fixed), facilitates recognition of the 
complexity of the play of power in these exchanges. A particular statement from 
a boy is open to various interpretations, including that of threat to steal Burman’s 
bicycle. Her interpretation of it recognizes cultural adult-child relations, the 
specific context of the co-operative switch of ‘roles’, and her actual retention of 
certain authority despite this. She comes to understand it as a request that the 
topic of conversation shifts. Its implicit nature prevented the shift from being 
abrupt or from challenging her (supposedly relinquished) conversational control. 
Thus, such an analysis can conceptualise power as operating through both the 
manipulated (in the ‘role exchange’), and the underlying, positions of researcher 
and researched (and show the children’s understanding of this distinction), 
without simplifying to a model of power as summative. Burman goes ‘beyond 
simply affirming different accounts’ and warrants her own interpretation by 
arguing it is produced and fixed by the power relationships, (though it is not the 
only one warranted by them): ‘The point here is not to arrive at a unique and 
unambiguous interpretation, but to demonstrate that an analysis of power 
relations privileges some interpretations over others’. (ibid: 54) 
 
Indeed, this indeterminacy, she argues, is itself only a function of the text being 
taken out of its linguistic and wider discursive context. Thus, discourse analytic 
work which is informed by post-structuralist understandings of power can 
demonstrate how power enters into the interpretation, as well as the production, 
of discourse (Burman, ibid). This includes how power inheres in the processes of 
analysis ‘back in the academy’ as well as in the research encounter. However, 
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this type of micro-analysis still, inevitably, abstracts the interaction from its 
context to some degree, and places it in another context for viewing from other 
perspectives. We can be critical of a researcher’s (political) judgement, and 
hopefully, such critical scrutiny is invited by a reflexive style that acknowledges 
that the analysis is an artefact, produced in a particular moment, by a person 
occupying particular subject positions, and within the particular power relations 
described. 
 
A ‘new ethnography’? 
Some discursive approaches employ qualified empiricism, as the above 
illustrates, and some ethnographic approaches recognize that representation is 
an active, not merely reflective, practice. So, moving beyond my oppositional 
account, there are now, in fact, researchers who occupy a range of 
epistemological positions ‘within’ each approach. 
 
Ethnography has not remained untouched by the ‘turn to language’. In addition to 
radical critiques across the disciplines of cultural studies, critical anthropology 
and sociology (Nencel and Pels, 1991; Probyn, 1993; Ticeneto Clough, 1992), 
there are also ethnographers who are developing a ‘more textual’ ethnography 
within sociology (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 239), for instance, Plummer’s 
(1995) sociology of sexual stories. In a chapter about the rhetorics or poetics of 
ethnographic writing - perhaps tellingly at the end of the book - Hammersley and 
Atkinson argue that an ethnography ‘...is produced as much by how we write as 
by the processes of data collection and analysis’ (ibid: 239). Therefore, unlike in 
Corsaro’s much earlier work, their reflexivity does include textual production 
within its remit. However, they maintain a broadly objective-realist perspective, 
illustrated by their remark that it is ‘knowledge of’, rather than politics, which 
motivates them. 
 
Similarly, Berry Mayall’s (1996) research with children is strongly influenced by 
ethnography, yet - as with many others in contemporary UK childhood studies - is 
also informed by social constructionism. She writes of how children’s lives are 
framed within adult understandings of what children are like, and problematizes 
the conceptualization of children as Other. She partially relativizes her account 
by recognizing that ‘...no doubt another approach would lead to another story of 
where and how children’s lives are lived’ (ibid: 19), but retains an empiricist 
warrant and employs the ‘up the mountain’ discourse of new scientific knowledge 
improving on the old (Kitzinger, 1987; Rorty, 1980). Her position is neither that of 
radical social constructionist nor ‘naive’ objective-realist, but the empiricist 
epistemology locates her closer to realist ethnography than post-structuralism.  
 
Mayall presents statements from children’s accounts ‘contextualized’ within 
comments from interviews with adults. Inevitably it is Mayall’s own conceptual 
frame that allows her to articulate the comments from children with those of 
adults. She recognizes the power imbalance between herself and the child 
interviewees and is modest about the extent to which it can be rectified. She 
even wonders: ‘...[i]f one is not a child, can one and should one attempt to 
understand and convey what children’s experiences are?’ (ibid: 1). She describes 
child-friendly measures she took during the interaction (sitting on low chairs, 
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letting children choose their companions), and she briefly reflects upon her 
position as author of ‘children’s accounts’, acknowledging that it is her own 
argument and mentioning her hope that in future research she will co-write with 
participants. She therefore engages both of Probyn’s (1993) two levels of 
reflexivity: that is, within the interaction, and in the interpretation and production 
of the research account. However, on the issue of textual authority, whilst she is 
explicit about the authority of her account vis-a-vis the child participants, she 
does not open up issues of the text’s authority as one claiming an empirical 
warrant. This might have been explored through reflexivity about the processes 
by which she produced her analysis (for instance, meshing together adult and 
child accounts) and the rhetorical style in which it is presented. 
 
This raises several points. Firstly, we are reminded that how researchers present 
their work, including their epistemological warrants, relates to considerations of 
forum, format, and funding. Working within a research unit that is grant-
dependent, (as does Mayall), does not lend itself to radical critique of the 
research enterprise. Secondly, it illustrates the complexity of positions we may 
take up as researchers: recognizing the productivity of language, yet 
incorporating such insight into empiricist ethnographic methodology. The radical 
challenges the concept of discourse may present can be neutralized by an 
appropriating gesture (Burman, 1990), and the ‘findings’ of discourse analytic 
research (about interaction between researcher and ‘subject’) can even be taken 
up to ‘improve’ mainstream experimental work (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 
Thirdly, the issue of research strategies provides an alternative way of seeing 
this second point: retaining an objective-realist research warrant provided Mayall 
with a more powerful position and may have made the particular intervention she 
desired more effective. However, as readers of the study we cannot actually 
distinguish between an unreflexive conventional style, and an account which for 
strategic purposes employs conventional rhetoric and ‘...deliberately conceal[s] 
any ostensive signs of reflexivity’ (Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988: 6). Thus, 
Mayall’s approach may either be straight-forwardly realist, or her account may 
reflect a decision to take up the authoritative ‘voice’ of the researcher. 
 
Some pitfalls and possibilities of hybrid approaches 
The warrant we claim for our research knowledge, whether stated explicitly or 
implied by rhetorical style, is the basis of its authority. Feminists have identified 
the danger of ‘kicking the platform from under our own feet’ (Burman, 1990) by 
deconstructing the warrant for our preferred account, but some (Burman et al., 
1996; Weedon, 1987) see feminist possibilities in the selective use of post-
structuralist arguments such as those employed here. The privilege accorded 
empirical knowledge makes research powerful, and because the discourse of 
‘hearing the voices of children’ is highly persuasive in contemporary UK cultural 
politics, ethnographic realism probably provides the most effective warrant for 
intervention, say, in debates about health or education services for children. So, 
might I adopt the discourse of voice and employ qualified empirical warrants? 
The sections above illustrated how empirical claims are sometimes made 
alongside differing degrees of reflexivity, or recognition of ethical issues 
surrounding a researcher’s power to interpret and to produce an account and the 
significance of the broader cultural meanings assigned childhood. If one refuses 
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to employ arrogant, ‘self-centred’ assertions of objectivity, yet can see current 
political value in them, could a self-reflexive, re-presentation of others’ ‘voices’ 
enable partial uptake of research authority? This would not resolve the dilemma 
once and for all, but neither is that desirable. Burman et al. (1996) argue that we 
might consider our research as a series of strategic decisions, rather than wed 
ourselves to any particular approach. Such committment to an approach would 
be to imagine that any approach could embody (our) politics and would suggest 
inadequate attention to the context which informs how our research is heard. As 
a temporary strategy it allows movement beyond the impasse, but is tentative 
and resists closure - thereby requiring its context-specific reinvention. 
 
A strong case can be made for presenting research as ‘hearing the voices of 
children’, and children as deserving and capable of articulating their perspectives, 
whilst there are still important political gains for children in being granted full 
subject status. However, we must consider the potential risks of employing the 
voice rhetoric in each particular case: generalized assertions cannot be made 
about how it may operate. So, for each research account, we must assess 
whether the particular research issue or the general affirmation of children as 
subjects outweighs the pitfalls described above: the reification of ‘the centre’ at 
the expense of the Other; the re-assertion of objective-realism; and the obscuring 
of the researcher’s role and denial of perspective in the discourse of 
representation as portrayal. 
 
Might a ‘hybrid’ position be possible in which the discourse of voice is employed, 
but subjects are not attributed authenticity outside of (dominant) culture? Instead, 
we can present them as finding ‘their voices’ within and through the networks of 
meanings made available to them, including where they resist the dominant 
meanings ascribed them (as does Marks, 1996). Employing the discourse of 
voice risks reinforcing ideas about the psychological subject, but perhaps there 
are some ways of limiting this, such as by surrounding the term voice with 
quotation marks to indicate its metaphorical status. Referring to ‘subject 
positions’ allows for an individual to be multiply or shiftingly positioned and hence 
avoids complicity with the fantasy of unitary, logical beings whose experiences 
are stable, fixed by identity and internally coherent (Butler, 1990). We might 
retain the distinction in this chapter between children’s voices themselves and 
the discourse of ‘the voices of children’ and it may be appropriate to make this 
distinction explicit. The discourse may still be heard in the singular (‘the voice of 
the child’) but for this piece I did not feel the compromise of reinforcing 
homogeneity amongst children was necessary. The argument for the recognition 
of differences amongst children might appear, in the abstract, to be robust and 
incontestable, but there may be times when we decide this oversimplification is 
worthwhile. James and Prout (1990) suggest that we use the past tense in 
empirical narratives, because the present tense fixes children in a timeless place 
devoid of context thereby contributing to their objectification. These suggetsions 
sketch an approach which could still link perspectives to social location, but 
would aim to avoid relying on the concept of identity in such a way as to fix and 
over-simplify the connection. In these ways, local empirical narratives employing 
the voice metaphor in a qualified way - what we might call discourse-ethnography 
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- could provide ways of doing politics and research without grounding positions in 
reified identities.  
 
However, some cautionary notes are needed: methods rest upon methodologies, 
which themselves embody particular epistemological positions. Given that the 
most crucial aspect of the context of the public research account to be 
considered relates to the authority necessary to intervene, the risk of a hybrid 
method is that it makes neither epistemological claim authoritatively. For 
instance, it would be problematic to present a realist warrant, (such as for 
ethnography), within an account that has set up a non-realist framework. 
‘Triangulation’ - using more than one method to study an object - could not 
employ a discursive approach alongside a non-discursive one, because 
triangulation assumes realism for its object. Such separation of methods from 
their epistemological perspectives is not only an issue of theoretical coherence: 
in order to take up ‘the voice’ of knowledge authoritatively one usually has to 
state one or other type of claim. If we assume that such epistemological 
inconsistencies may go unnoticed in a given forum, questions arise about how 
explicit we ought to be about our epistemological commitments. 
 
Reflexivity 
If reflexivity involves being explicit about the operation of power within the actual 
processes of researching and representing people (Burman, 1992; Ribbens, 
1989), we become suspicious of the techniques (as well as epistemological 
claims) through which accounts are rendered authoritative. Researchers’ power 
can be conceptualized as operating through multiple levels: through the 
hegemonic cultural perspective contained within the language we (must) use; 
through the subject positions we take up and are positioned within (including our 
deliberate claims to researcher positions); and through our particular individual 
relationships with participants and to our field of inquiry. In relation to research 
with children, the first was illustrated earlier through the adult-centrism of 
language and the second was explored through Burman’s study, where the 
particularity of research with children is the conflation of adult/child with 
researcher/researched. The third level raises very interesting questions in 
relation to research with children: how do we account for our own unconscious 
projections and fantasies concerning children, which include those stemming 
from our own experiences, above and beyond culture-wide ones?  
 
Ethnographic research raises questions about how much to listen and how much 
to interpret (Ribbens, 1989), but discourse analytic approaches highlight how the 
two cannot ultimately be separated out. If we necessarily hear others through 
culturally dominant meanings, an unacknowledged perspective is most likely the 
hegemonic one. The task of reflexivity, according to Mishler (1986), is to make 
explicit the theoretical basis of interpretation. Deconstructing the photographic 
meaning of representation, as a critique of objectivism begs, means taking 
greater caution over our representational claims and avoiding obscuring the 
perspectival nature of knowledge. This issue emerges in considering how close 
to keep to participants’ actual words (see Kay Standing, this volume). Whilst their 
language and concepts will be of central interest if we wish to (and believe it is 
possible to) re-present (portray), we might wish, or be drawn, to employ more 
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politically relevant terms and analytic frameworks when we want to make 
representation for/about children either as advocacy, or when we take it upon 
ourselves to intervene in what Stuart Hall (1992) calls ‘the relations of 
representation’. The options can be understood as being about the 
representative role we adopt. Finch (1993) described the conflict she faced 
between using women’s own terms, and providing the structural analysis she felt 
their position called for, and Ribbens (1989) argued that if we do not agree with 
what our participants say, we will have to decide in the context whether and how 
we try to respect their opinions. In research with children, this conflict is between 
promoting particular re/presentations of children as a social group, and re-
presenting the accounts of the particular children who participated. We must be 
clear about when our priority is to make an admittedly flawed (say, qualified 
empirical) re/presentation of children’s voices, and when it is for the presentation 
of our analyses, reflecting an adult, and perhaps personal, agenda within cultural 
politics. The dilemma can then be located within the realm of research strategy if, 
from the start of a given piece of research, we are clear about whether we are 
engaging in representational politics, and in which case will present aspects of 
the research in particular ways to intervene on particular issues; or we are 
attempting to hear and re-present particular children’s voices. I would want to be 
decisive about this from the outset in order to be explicit with my participants 
about which type of representative role I was taking, and clear, though not 
necessarily explicit within it, about my priorities for any particular representative 
act. It appears that in either case, we might employ literal (‘naive’), or reflexive, or 
covertly reflexive representational warrants (as discussed earlier).  
 
Of course, the two-horns of the dilemma are an ideal separation because even if 
we adopt an empirical warrant for placing the ‘voices of children’ in the public 
sphere, we surely retain responsibility for not re-presenting uncritically, say, a 
racist discourse. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) and Parker and Burman 
(1993) agree that the researcher’s responsibility extends to consideration of the 
default meanings of the context of research publication. What we consider to be 
progressive re/presentations could be subverted and carry undesirable meanings 
in another context. We cannot completely control the meanings that can be made 
of our research (Foucault, 1983). Not only might our careful wordings, qualifiers 
and warrants be lost, but another context might produce meanings that we could 
not have predicted. We cannot ensure our preferred readings, but we must 
attempt to ward off ones we believe to be oppressive. These, as well as 
decisions about how to frame, how to write, how and where to publish, are more 
than mere ‘editorial control’ over the accounts, and our politics are clearly highly 
significant, yet because of the taboo on speaking of politics in academic work (a 
legacy of objectivism), I have found few spaces - although the Women’s 
Workshop has been one - for discussing these concerns. Without recognition and 
discussion of these dilemmas we risk relying on unexamined assumptions. 
Reflexive discussion amongst researchers and activists can thus inform our 
strategies, but are sometimes blocked by the presumption of realism. Hopefully, 
being reflexive enables us not simply to reproduce the cultural positions, but to 
ask new questions about the existence of these positions. 
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Reflexivity can be extended to make explicit the warrants we employ for the 
status of our accounts, to attempt to disassemble them where we feel it is 
appropriate, but perhaps taking up some positions of authority and presenting 
our research as knowledge where we feel it is politically expedient to do so. To 
demonstrate our recognition that we actively provide narratives for our material, 
and construct the authority of knowledge, we may use active verbs such as 
‘producing’ (also avoiding the realist implication of pre-existing data), and might 
undo the specular metaphors of research which obscure the processes, deny the 
particularity of perspective and the differential investments in particular kinds of 
knowledge. However, it might sometimes be useful to exclude discussion of our 
methodological dilemmas in our finished reports. This goes against the grain of 
recent feminist research debates about making explicit both our practices and 
dilemmas, but there might be good grounds for considering which ‘public’ we are 
open with about issues; an audience of feminist and critical researchers (such as 
I assume here), or a broader audience (when we aim to disseminate our reports 
widely). Could we choose a strategy of omitting the discussion of decision-
making processes or the political nature of knowledge production, that is, 
maintaining these conventional silences? For instance, might we deliberately 
employ the specular metaphors of research despite their implicit objective-realist 
warrants? The description earlier of different epistemological warrants within 
either discourse of representation suggests moments at which this might be 
useful. However, is it ever acceptable to present a piece of research with a 
contradiction between its re/presentational claims and our actual confidence in 
these claims? This is one of the ethical/political questions politically motivated 
researchers might begin to discuss more broadly. One of the contributions of a 
book such as this is the opportunity to voice questions and discuss the dilemmas 
we work with, without the same pressure to find ‘answers’ that writing for a 
broader public usually requires. 
 
How our accounts might be heard 
Being critical of the presuppositions of the voice discourse would not necessarily 
prevent me from insisting ‘that children be heard’ in a particular forum. However, 
when employing it, I would be concerned that my research might satisfy the 
demand that ‘the voices of children’ be heard, without actually altering how they 
are heard, or challenging the limited impact that what children say usually has. 
 
Discursive approaches, by rejecting the possibility of escape from the cultural 
web of meanings, direct our attention to the consideration of what ideas we 
unwittingly reinforce. Given that the cultural construction of childhood is 
dominated by discourses of developmental psychology, there is a danger of 
reifying these particular ideas about children through our research. Even our 
strategic use of ‘voice’ metaphors may endorse the hegemonic notion of the 
rational, integrated, psychological subject (of which post-structuralist positions 
and some non post-structuralist feminist positions are critical), but furthermore, 
these may have particular implications for children. 
 
Children, in particular, can be closely associated with the emotions, through 
ideas which link them to nature, and through discourses of their development 
towards rationality (Walkerdine, 1988). Where rationality is privileged, 
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‘emotionality’ can disqualify them as research participants. Similarly, failure to 
meet the expectations of conventional interview research (of consistency, and of 
‘independence’ from the researcher), can be interpreted as failings of children to 
be successful interviewees, rather than problems with the mythical notion of the 
‘individual’ which underpins the approach. This too can function to undermine the 
idea that children can, or should, be ‘given voice’. The concept of attitude (or 
opinion) involves a single, stable or consistent perspective (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987). However, interviewing anyone about ‘family’, for instance, will elicit a 
range of contradictory ideas, so a contribution of discourse analytic work is to 
demonstrate that multiplicity, complexity and contradiction are features of our 
linguistic repertoire, rather than the incompetent expression, or limited cognitive 
sophistication, of a particular child. In conventional accounts, the ambiguity of 
children’s talk would either not be recognized, or, if acknowledged, would be 
interpreted as evidence of immature logical reasoning or loss of narrative control 
because of its abstraction from social relationships (Burman, 1992).  
 
For the above reasons, we may be critical of children being ‘given voice’ only if 
they can present themselves as subjects or individuals in this (Cartesian) sense, 
and ambivalent about some of the policy changes which require such bases for 
recognition. For instance, my support for the 1989 Children Act’s requirement 
that children’s wishes be heard on decisions that affect them, is tempered by the 
knowledge that popular psychological notions about children (about fantasy, 
‘impressionability’, reliability as witnesses) form the inescapable context within 
which statements will be heard. The complexity of issues that we face is 
illustrated by the fact that these same psychological discourses of the subject 
which allow some children to be heard, will disallow other children, including 
those who present contradictory or illogical accounts and don’t manage to make 
themselves understood by (particular) adults, in ‘adults’ terms’. Attaining subject 
status in current hegemonic discourse is fraught with risks as well as benefits for 
those currently on its margins. 
 
Even after we have adopted a strategy either of engaging in representational 
politics or of claiming to re/present particular children, further issues may arise 
which repeat this question. Within either approach, particular discourses may 
have apparently contradictory implications. For instance, the discourse of child 
protection can reinforce the idea that children are weak, vulnerable and in need 
of (adult) protection (Kitzinger, 1990), even as they simultaneously provide help 
for particular children. Alternatively, there may be times when this kind of 
emphasis benefits children as a social group, say in securing funding for 
services, but is unhelpful for an individual child.  
 
Even though ‘the voices of children’ discourse is deliberately plural, (as 
mentioned above), there is the danger that invoking the category, despite taking 
care to speak of particular children, risks reifying children as an homogeneous 
social group whose ‘nature’ is different from that of adults. As for the category 
‘women’, there may be times when the benefits of naming the social group 
outweigh the costs. Throughout this chapter I have retained ‘children’ as an 
unproblematized category in order to focus on questions of representation. I have 
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presumed the constituency of childhood when, perhaps, the dilemmas in 
representing children depend crucially on which children. 
 
Kay Standing (this volume) also explores the risk that our research reinforces 
assumptions about the research participants. There is the danger that our 
critiques reify what we would rather dispel if we concentrate too much on 
dominant meanings, with too little attention to times and places in which they are 
contested (Alcoff, 1988). Parker and Burman remind discourse analysts of the 
importance of theorising the ‘...fluctuations and transformations in discursive 
relations to ward off a reading of them as unchanging’ (1993: 164). This dilemma 
can be aligned crudely with the tension between ‘gritty realism’ (‘showing it like it 
is’) and ‘positive images’ (presenting a preferred version). It re-states the 
alternative between re-presentation (understood as empirical, realist) or 
re/presentation (as an intervention in cultural politics). I have argued that, 
although this is a false opposition (as Walkerdine,1990, and others have shown) 
and risks reasserting a truth/ideology distinction (see, for example, Barrett, 
1991), it can be useful for thinking strategically about our research. 
 
Representations in the public sphere: choosing a strategy 
To summarize, our strategic decisions might include, not only which approach to 
adopt and what representational claims to make, but also, precisely how reflexive 
to be about these in a given forum. One could be aware of the rhetorical ploys 
and epistemological imperialisms by which one’s textual authority is supported, 
but choose not to deconstruct it at a given point, in which case, the strategic use 
of conventional research rhetoric might be indistinguishable from its unreflexive 
use (Woolgar and Ashmore, 1988). However, in doing so, hitherto taken-for-
granted notions may have been displaced. For example, James and Prout (1996) 
call for children to be studied within family contexts once again because they are 
an ‘...important social context in which children discover [sic] their identities 
(James, 1994)’ (James and Prout, 1996: 42), rather than, unthinkingly, because 
the family has been naturalised as the place where children exist. Another 
illustration might be using the discourse of ‘public sphere’ in order to emphasize 
the broader political consequences of our research, even though we might reject 
theoretically the idea that there can be a separate sphere of (private) meanings 
which are not cultural which it sometimes implies. Perhaps another illustration is 
my use of the notion of strategy despite its implication of rational, goal-oriented 
subjects (and its militaristic resonances) (Edwards and Ribbens, 1991), 
alongside the fact that I have deconstructed this model of the subject in relation 
to interviewees, whilst retaining it to speak of us decision-making researchers!  
 
In the same way that researchers set the terms for discussion in an interview, so 
public debate may already be framed in such a way - again by adults - that 
intervening within the terms of the debate is a compromise. A sense of 
perspective is needed to weigh up whether an idea is worth challenging, or 
whether granting it research attention bolsters its status. This can be thought of 
as a question about whether to try to make gains within the existing terms of the 
debate or to challenge those terms (Alldred, 1996; Kitzinger, 1987; Prince and 
Hartnett, 1993). The dilemma, again, concerns the risk of reification by critiques. 
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How specific to research with children are the dilemmas discussed here? It 
seems that the theoretical issues are not specific, but apply across the board in 
feminist and critical research. However, the precise meanings assigned 
childhood in this culture make the detail of the dilemmas of research with children 
particular. Ideas about marginal groups may be structured similarly in relation to 
the presumed centre, but do not necessarily require the same responses. It is the 
specific forms of these dilemmas to which researchers must attend in relation to 
the participants’ social group, and in relation to the precise moment and location 
of their research intervention. Thus, the possible losses and gains of employing 
the discourse of hearing voices must be considered in relation to children (as a 
rhetorical category), and perhaps in relation to particular children, and the 
discourse might then be drawn on with varying degrees of literality. 
 
Whilst much feminist research is concerned with adequately recognizing 
difference, representing children within research is always characterised by 
Otherness across the construction of a defining adult-child difference. Unlike 
Women’s Studies, Childhood Studies has not arisen from a politics of experience 
(Oakley, 1994) and is conducted by adults on those who are Other to them. 
Children do, of course, make political representations on their own behalf, as well 
as on behalf of others (Hoyles, 1989), but more often through direct action, rather 
than through re/presentational or symbolic politics. As adults representing 
children we can try to recognize the ways in which our researcher status may 
confound and exploit our adult status, and clarify whether we are representing 
children in the realist, photographic sense of portrayal, or using our political 
perspective to make judgements about the way they are represented as we 
engage in struggles about ‘recognition’ or meaning. Referring to ‘children’s 
perspectives’, naming their particularity, even though inevitably drawing into play 
their Otherness and our cultural centrality, we may be able to make use of the 
benefits this can provide in claiming that people who are marginalised ‘as 
children’ ought to be heard. Researchers interviewing children need to consider 
how we hear children’s voices, meaning not only the approaches we employ, but 
also how the representations we make of their voices will be heard in the public 
sphere. Children’s voices need to be heard alongside critical attention to the way 
childhood is constructed. This should then inform a more preliminary question, 
which, as Alderson (1995) notes, is often bypassed: not how, but whether the 
research should be done, and, I would add, not just how, but whether each 
particular re/presentational act should be made. 
 
